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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
Case No. 960665-CA
Priority No. 2

NELSON RODRIGUEZ-LOPI
Defendant/Appellant

ARGUMENT
I. THE STOP OF RODRIGUEZ'S TRUCK WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION AND THUS ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED PURSUANT
TO THE STOP IS INADMISSIBLE.
The State asserts that the officers acted upon reasonable
suspicion in stopping Rodriguez, noting the early hour, closeness
to the curb, slow rate of speed in an area known for
prostitution, the fact that both men in the truck were leaned
over toward two women walking up the Street, and that one of the
officers knew the women to be prostitutes.

See R.B. at 10-14.

However, the given circumstances do not support a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.

This Court has

repeatedly held that travel at a suspicious time and place alone
is insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.

See State v.

Sykes, 840 P.2d 825 (Utah App. 1992); State v. Seward, 806 P.2d
213 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Truiillo. 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App.,
1987).

Even under the most suspect of circumstances, and where

the suspect's activity suggests criminal behavior, this Court has
held that the reasonable suspicion is lacking where there is mere

conjecture as to the "connection between defendant and the
illegal activity" without other "positive evidence linking the
[defendant] to the illegal act."

Sykes, 840 P.2d at 828-29.

Accordingly, in Sykes, this Court found reasonable suspicion
lacking where an officer stopped defendant based on an
observation of defendant driving up to house who entered and left
in a short time period, knowledge that neighbors complained about
incessant coming and going from that house, the fact that the
officer had made a purchase in the general area, plus unspecified
information from a confidential informant.
828.

Sykes, 840 P.2d at

Likewise in Truiillo, this Court held that reasonable

suspicion did not exist where the officer stopped the defendant
because he was walking at a late hour in a high crime area and
that he appeared nervous and let go of his knapsack when the
officer approached.

Truiillo, 739 P.2d at 90; see also Steward,

806 P.2d at 216 (holding no reasonable suspicion based on driving
on public road at late hour).
The stop at issue in this case is analogous to the
unreasonable stops in Sykes, Trujillo, and Steward in that there
are no positive factors linking Rodriguez to criminal activity.
First, there were no indications that a solicitation was
occurring or about to occur.

Rodriguez continued to drive as he

passed the women, albeit at a slow speed; he did not stop.
Record ("R.") 166, 168, 183. At ten miles per hour, he would be
rapidly overcoming the walking women, leaving no time to strike a
deal.

The officers did not observe the women act as if they were
2

responding to an offer (i.e. approach the car, get in the car).
The officers merely observed that Rodriguez's passenger was
talking to the women; the officers could not overhear the
conversation, however.

R. 161, 182. Talking to women, even if

they are prostitutes, is not illegal.

See State v. Munsen, 821

P.2d 13, 15 (Utah App. 1991) (defendants proximity to another who
was removing stereo from car parked in empty lot at late hour did
not support reasonable suspicion) (citing Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 91 (1979)("person's mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does not, without
more, give rise to probable cause to search the person"); Brown
v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1979)(mere presence in area
frequented by drug users does not support reasonable suspicion);
State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991) (no reasonable
suspicion where man walking near defendant ran away)).

Without

other objective manifestations of solicitation (i.e. stopping the
car) the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion that
Rodriguez was up to something more than innocent activity.
Other factors bear against the finding of reasonable
suspicion.

With regard to the early hour and the location, many

neighborhoods surround the particular area of State Street where
Rodriguez was stopped.
early hour.

Moreover, many people go to work at an

It would not be unusual, therefore, for people to be

driving to work at the same time and through the same area.

As -

to the slow speed, as discussed above, it is not a crime, nor is
it extraordinary, that two young men slow down to talk to two
3

women walking, even if the women are prostitutes.

This is

especially true where prostitutes (assuming the women were
prostitutes) are normally enticingly dressed.
Finally, the State's assertion that the stop was legally
premised on a reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation is
unsupported in case law.

R.B. 13. The facts do not suggest that

Rodriguez was driving under the influence.

The officers

testified that he maintained a constant course and speed, albeit
to the right of the lane.

R. 161-68, 182-83.

Contrary to the

weaving and erratic driving pattern of one under the influence,
Rodriguez maintained control of his car.

See Sandy City v.

Thorsness, 778 P.2d 1011 (Utah App. 1989)(no reasonable suspicion
of DUI in absence of reckless or erratic driving).

Consequently,

Officer Farris' claim that the stop was premised on a suspicion
of a possible DUI is disingenuous, as well as unfounded under
Utah law.

R. 161; A.B. 13-14.

The State maintains that "these facts may not, like
Thorsness, suggest a possible DUI, [however] they are indicative
of a lane violation and/or reckless driving."

R.B. 13 (citing

Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-61(1) (lane violation), 41-6-45 (reckless
driving) (1993)).

As to a possible lane violation, Section 41-6-

61(1) provides that "[a] vehicle shall be operated as nearly as
practical entirely within a single lane."
fact, driving within the lane of travel.

Rodriguez was, in
Rodriguez was not

driving in the gutter or on the sidewalk, but rather remained on
the paved portion of the road at all times.
4

R. 161-68, 182-83.

The State claims that Rodriguez was driving in an "unauthorized
travel lane.1' R.B. 13. However, where the street did not
otherwise bear parking area markings, such as signs or painted
lines on the road, Rodriguez was driving in accordance with
Section 41-6-61(1).

Specifically, Rodriguez was driving "within

a single lane." Accordingly, the stop was not legally premised
on a violation of Section 41-6-61(1).
With regard to possible reckless driving, Section 41-6-45
provides that "any person who operates a vehicle in willful or
wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty
of reckless driving."

Rodriguez did not exhibit "willful or

wanton disregard" for safety merely by driving slowly to the
right of the lane.

Rodriguez did not endanger himself, his

passenger or any one else by his actions nor did he threaten
anyone's property.

The officers did not note that he was holding

other traffic up or otherwise causing a road hazard to
pedestrians or drivers.

In fact, there were likely few people on

the road at the early morning hour when the incident occurred.
As discussed above, Rodriguez's apparent control over his truck
indicates that he did not wantonly or willfully endanger persons
or property in violation of Section 41-6-45. Accordingly, a stop
premised on a possible reckless driving violation was not
supported by a reasonable suspicion.
In light of the foregoing, reasonable suspicion was lacking
where the officers did not articulate other manifestations of
either solicitation or a traffic violation.
5

To find otherwise

would open the door for intrusion upon the innocent traveler who,
at the wrong place and time, gratuitously slows down to talk to a
girl.

While polite society does not smile upon such behavior,

our laws and constitution protect the privacy of individuals who
engage in these acts.

Absent other objective manifestations of

criminal activity, the officers were not justified in their
suspicions, but rather acted upon unconstitutional hunches.
II. THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT IS NOT RELIABLE HEARSAY FOR
PURPOSES OF THE PRELIMINARY HEARING: ABSENT THE REPORT, THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING MAGISTRATE LACKED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE BINDOVER.
A. THE STATE PROFFERS AN OVER BROAD DEFINITION OF "RELIABLE
HEARSAY" FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING.
The State notes that reliable hearsay is admissible at a
preliminary hearing.

See Respondent's Brief ("R.B.") 16.

However, the State offers a definition of "reliable hearsay" that
is overbroad, misconstrued and disregards statutory language and
case law mandating that the rules of evidence are determinative
of "reliable hearsay" at a preliminary hearing.
The State draws its definition of "reliable hearsay" from
the Rights of Crime Victims Act ("Act").

R.B. 16. The Act

defines "reliable hearsay" as "'information worthy of confidence,
including any information whose use at sentencing is permitted by
the United States Constitution.'"
2(4) (1995).

See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38-

The State also asserts that "'[h]earsay evidence is

freely permitted by the [U.S.] Constitution at sentencing," and
thus implies that "reliable hearsay" should be construed to
permit a wide scope of hearsay evidence at a preliminary hearing.
6

R.B. 16-17 (quotation omitted).
In fact, hearsay evidence is not "freely permitted" at
federal sentencing hearings. As a matter of due process, certain
standards of reliability must be met before hearsay may be
considered.

First, hearsay must be sufficiently reliable to

support its probable accuracy.

See United States v. Farnsworth,

92 F.3d 1001, 1010 (10th Cir. 1996).

The defendant must also

have a reasonable opportunity to rebut the hearsay evidence.

See

United States v. Arthur Barnes, 1997 WL 311569 *8 (7th Cir 1997) .
Hearsay is not otherwise admissible.
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, 856 P.2d 1064
(Utah 1993), applied a similar reliability standard with regard
to hearsay evidence presented at sentencing.

The Johnson Court

thus held that a sentencing judge erred in considering "highly
unreliable" evidence consisting of double and triple hearsay
alleging that the defendant sexually abused a child.
1072-73.

Id. at

"To require a defendant to assume the burden of

disproving highly unreliable evidence might well violate due
process."

Id. at 1073 (citing State v. Howell, 707 P.2d 115, 118

(Utah 1985); State v. Casarez, 656 P.2d 1005, 1007 (Utah 1982);
State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980)).

In light of

the foregoing, the State's broad interpretation of the Act's
definition of "reliable hearsay" is a misstatement of the law
that disregards the due process concerns inherent in "freely
permitt[ing]" hearsay evidence in a criminal proceeding.
The State's reliance on the Crime Victims Act is further
7

misplaced given the legislative purpose underlying the Act and
the constituent constitutional amendment to Article I, Section
12.

Article I, § 12, as amended, provides in part, "[n]othing in

this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any
preliminary examination to determine probable cause."

The

amendment's proponents made constant reference to rights of crime
victims, especially victims of rape and child abuse, in arguing
that the amendment would spare victims the trauma of having to
face the perpetrator at the preliminary hearing.

See Utah Senate

Floor Debates, Tape # 28, Feb. 16, 1994 (Day 31), p.m. session
(debating definition of "reliable hearsay" under constitutional
amendment; Utah House Floor Debates, Tape # 1 & 2, Mar. 2, 1994
(Day 45) (same).
The instant case, by contrast, does not involve a human
victim akin to the vulnerable rape or incest victim contemplated
by the proponents of Article I, § 1 2 .
a cold report.

Rather, this case involves

The purpose of the Act, as implemented through

Article I, § 12, is not served by adopting the Act's definition
of "reliable hearsay" for purposes of the admissibility of the
report at issue in this case.

There is no victim to spare from

the sort of probing, insensitive inquiry that compromises the
victim's right to be involved in the criminal process in the
"least traumatic, intrusive, or intimidating manner."

Utah Code

Ann. § 77-37-1(2) (1995) (stating legislative intent behind
victims' rights).
8

Finally, the State's definition disregards statutory and
case law directing that the rules of evidence define "reliable
hearsay, ,! as well as qualifying language within Article I, § 12
expressly directing that "reliable hearsay" is to be defined by
"statute or rule."

See Appellant's Brief ("A.B.") 17-22.

In

light of the language of Article I, § 12, statutory and case law,
the Utah Rules of Evidence are the appropriate index of reliable
hearsay for preliminary hearing purposes.
B. THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ARE DETERMINATIVE OF "RELIABLE
HEARSAY" FOR PURPOSES OF A PRELIMINARY HEARING AND SERVE TO
PROTECT A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR PROCEEDING.
The State asserts that evidence rules are inapplicable to
preliminary hearings, citing Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control
Com'n, 681 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1984).
upon Yacht Club is misplaced.

R.B. 17. The State's reliance

First, Article I, § 12, court

rules and case law provide that the rules of evidence govern, and
are thus determinative of "reliable hearsay", at a preliminary
hearing.

See A.B. 17-22.

Second, Yacht Club involves an administrative proceeding,
which is qualitatively different from the criminal nature of a
preliminary hearing.

Utah has "long recognized that there are

significant differences between court trials and proceedings
before administrative agencies."

Yacht Club, 681 P.2d at 1226.

"It is undisputable that the legislature intended that the latter
should not be burdened with undue formality."

Lake Shore Motor

Coach Lines, Inc. v. Welling, 339 P.2d 1011, 1013-14 (Utah 1959).
Hence, the rules of evidence are inapplicable at administrative
,9

hearings.

Id. at 1014.

Preliminary hearings, by contrast, are characterized as a
"critical stage" of a criminal proceeding, "adversarial" in
nature.

See State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 782 n.9 (Utah

1980)(citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1969)); State v.
Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995); State v. Brickey, 714
P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986); Kearns-Tribune Corp., Publisher of
Salt Lake Tribune v. Lewis, 685 P.2d 515, 520 (Utah 1984).
"While the preliminary hearing is not a full-blown determination
of an accused's guilt or innocence, it is [] a 'critical stage'
in the criminal process" to the extent that it operates as a
means of discovery and preservation.

Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646;

State v. Willet, 909 P.2d 218, 222 (Utah

1995) (cross-

examination of witness at preliminary hearing may provide
testimony admissible at trial to bolster or attack credibility).
Hence, "proper consideration for a defendant's constitutional
rights must be observed."

Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646.x

1

Utah's characterization of the preliminary examination as
a critical stage is supported by United States Supreme Court
precedent. In Coleman, the Court held that a preliminary hearing
is a "critical stage" where the hearing involves discovery and
preservation of evidence, and thus poses "potential substantial
prejudice to [the] defendant." Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9-10
(defendant entitled to counsel at preliminary hearing). Likewise
in Gerstein v. Puah, 420 U.S. 103, 122, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d
54 (1975), which held that a Fourth Amendment probable cause
determination was not a critical stage, the Court again
acknowledged the critical nature of adversarial preliminary
hearings, akin to the hearing at issue in Coleman and Utah
hearings, which serve as tools of discovery and preservation.
Id. at 122-23. Accordingly, the Gerstein Court limited its
decision to Fourth Amendment probable cause determinations,
distinguishing such determinations from the adversarial
preliminary hearing at issue in Coleman. Id. at 123. "The
10

Utah law regarding sentencing is instructive as to the scope
of rights afforded at a preliminary hearing since both sentencing
and preliminary hearings are critical stages in which fundamental
fairness concerns are observed.

The Johnson Court held that

"hearsay evidence presented must bear "'sufficient indicia of
reliability to support its probable accuracy.'"
P.2d at 1072.

Johnson, 856

Likewise, the defendant must also enjoy the" right

to be confronted by the witnesses against him."

State v. Lipsky,

608 P.2d 1241, 1248 n.ll (Utah 1980)(citing Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400 (1965)).

These due process protections, afforded a

defendant at the sentencing phase by virtue of its "critical"
nature, must naturally extend to the preliminary examination,
also a "critical stage."
On account of the due process and confrontation rights
afforded at preliminary hearings, the evidentiary rules are the
necessary index of reliable hearsay to the extent that they serve
as procedural protections of such rights, especially
confrontation rights.

See Anderson, 612 P.2d at 785

("evidentiary rules excluding hearsay" preserve confrontation
rights); see, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155
(1970)("although not co-extensive, hearsay rules and the
Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values").

A brief overview of the purpose of confrontation

rights is helpful in appreciating how evidence rules function as
Fourth Amendment probable cause determination is addressed only
to pretrial custody" and thus serves a "limited function and [has
a] nonadversary character." Id. at 122-23.
11

procedural protections.
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his
statements under oath - thus impressing him with the
seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by
the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth"; (3)
permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to
observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement,
thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.
Green, 399 U.S. at 158 (quotation omitted).

To this end, the

evidentiary hearsay exceptions are circumscribed by Confrontation
Clause rights.

See Green, 399 U.S. at 155.

Accordingly, the hearsay exceptions define reliable
information for purposes of confrontation rights.

Ohio v.

Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)("reliability can be inferred . . .
where evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception");
see also State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 486 (Utah 1986)("exceptions
to the [hearsay] rule have evolved to permit the admission of
evidence that is deemed reliable notwithstanding its failure to
satisfy the hearsay rule").

As explained in Roberts:

[Reflecting its underlying purpose to augment accuracy in
the factfinding process by ensuring the defendant an
effective means to test adverse evidence, the
[Confrontation] Clause countenances only hearsay marked with
such trustworthiness that "there is no material departure
from the reason of the general rule [that hearsay evidence
is inadmissible].
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (quotation omitted).
Under these principles, the hearsay exceptions represent the
lowest level of reliability constitutionally allowed.

The

evidence rules and confrontation rights are not coextensive, and
hearsay evidence which falls under a hearsay rule is legally
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admissible even though such evidence contravenes confrontation
rights.

Green, 399 U.S. at 156. To fall below this already

minimized level of protection would be a "'material departure
from the reason of the rule'" such that the admission of the
evidence
rights.

would no longer be compatible with confrontation
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (quoting Snyder v.

Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)); see also Green, 399 U.S. at
156 (!l[g]iven similarity of the values protected", changes in
current hearsay rules raise questions of "compatibility" with
confrontation rights).
In light of the foregoing, the State's assertion that the
rules of evidence are inapplicable to preliminary hearings is
incorrect.
pursuant to

The evidentiary rules govern preliminary hearings
Article I, § 12, as well as statutory and case law.

The rules of evidence are thus determinative of "reliable
hearsay" at a preliminary hearing.

Further, the nature of a

preliminary hearing, a critical, adversarial stage in a criminal
proceeding that serves as a discovery and preservation device,
demands that the defendant be afforded certain due process
protections to ensure the probable accuracy of the evidence
against him, as well as a reasonable opportunity to confront such
evidence.

Insofar as evidentiary rules embody this minimum level

of protection, they are determinative of "reliable hearsay."
C. THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT IS UNRELIABLE HEARSAY NOT WITHIN
ANY HEARSAY EXCEPTION AND LACKS FOUNDATION WHICH MIGHT
OTHERWISE ESTABLISH ITS RELIABILITY.
The State asserts that the report is admissible as a public
13

record under Rule 803(8) (B), Utah R. Evid. (1997) . However, the
report does not fall under any hearsay exception such that it
amounts to "reliable hearsay" for preliminary hearing purposes,
nor does the report bear other "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness" that might otherwise establish its reliability.
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67.
In United State v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977), the
Second Circuit held a lab report, prepared by a U.S. Customs
Service chemisi, was inadmissible as a public record where the
preparer was not available to testify and the report constituted
a factual finding resulting from an investigation made pursuant
to statutory authority.

Id. at 66-67 (citing Rules 803(8) (B)

Fed. R. Evid.) . The Court relied on the language of

803(8) (B) ,

which expressly excludes reports generated in criminal cases by
"police officers or other law enforcement personnel."
(quoting Rule 803(8)(B), Fed. R. Evid.).

Id. at 67

The Court also reviewed

the legislative intent behind hearsay rules, noting that the
drafters were aware of "developments concerning the right to
confrontation" and sought to "eliminate . . . tension between the
hearsay rule[s] . . . and the confrontation clause."

Id. at 66,

78 (citing Advisory Committee Notes on the Rules of Evidence, 56
F.R.D. 183 (1972) ) .
In light of 803(8)(B) and the legislative intent, the Court
found the preparing chemist to be "other law enforcement
personnel" for purposes of the 803(8) (b) exclusion.

Id. at 68.

The Court noted that the chemist was a full-time Customs employee
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empowered with law enforcement authority; that the chemist
received the unidentified substance from other Customs agents for
the purpose of identifying it pursuant to his regular duty; that
the resulting report would be used in the eventual prosecution of
the offender; and that the chemist, in addition to all other
duties in anticipation of prosecution, would likely testify "as
an important prosecution witness" at trial regarding the test
results.

Id. at 68.

In short, these reports are not "made by persons and for
purposes unconnected with a criminal case (but rather they
are a direct) result of a test made for the specific purpose
of convicting the defendant and conducted by agents of the
executive branch, the very department of the government
which seeks defendant's conviction."
Id. (quotation omitted).
Under Oates, the report at issue here is inadmissible under
Utah Rule 803(8) (B) , Utah R. Evid., which is identical to the
federal rule applied in Oates.

See A.B. 25-32.

As the State

concedes, the report was prepared by a chemist from the state
crime lab, an employee of a police department instrumentality
whose express function is to test substances for purposes of
prosecuting crime.
(Supp. 1997) .

See R.B. 18; Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-104 (5)- (6)

In addition, the report was admitted without the

testimony of the preparer.

Accordingly, the report is excluded

by the express terms of 803(8) (B) and Oates where the chemist is
not otherwise available to testify.
The State asserts that toxicology reports are admissible as
public records under Yacht Club.
681 P.2d at 1227.

See R.B. 17 (citing Yacht Club,

The State further notes that Oates
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"restrictive view has been criticized," stating "a toxicology
result is the type of routine matter to which the public records
exception to the hearsay rule typically applies."

R.B. 21.

According to the State, "crime laboratory reports generally
follow a routine manner of preparation," hence "''the factors
likely to cloud the perception of an official engaged in the more
traditional law enforcement functions of observation and
investigation of crime simply are not present.''"

R.B. at 19

(quoting State v. Christian, 895 P.2d 676, 682 (N.M. App. 1995),
cert, denied, 892 P.2d 961 (N.M. 1995)(quoting United States v.
Ouezada. 754 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1985)).
Although Utah Courts have not addressed the admissibility in
a criminal matter of police reports under 803(8) (B) directly,
this Court has expressed its agreement with the more stringent
Oates rationale in Kehl v. Schwendiman. 735 P.2d 413 (Utah App.
1987) and Layton City v. Peronek, 803 P.2d 1294 (Utah App. 1990).
In Peronek, this Court opined that although a jail incident
report might be admissible under the business record exception,
it would nonetheless be excluded under 803(8) (B) since it was an
"investigatory report expected to lead to some form of
prosecutorial action."

Id. at 1298. Likewise in Kehl, the Court

stated that a DUI report "proffered by the state in a criminal
prosecution, even with the proper 'reliability7 affidavits, []
would clearly be inadmissible under the public records
exception."

Id. at 417 n.7 (holding DUI report inadmissible as

public for lack of foundation; citing Utah R. Evid. 803(8) (B) ) .
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Peronek, Kehl and other decisions echo the concerns
expressed in Oates regarding the risks to a defendant's
confrontation rights when reports prepared by a law enforcement
agency are admitted against a defendant, namely concerns of
reliability and independent analysis.
In most cases dealing with police reports of a criminal
investigation, it is apparent that the reports are made in
part in contemplation of litigation. Although the reports
may not be readily describable as "dripping with motivation
to misrepresent," their exclusion is more fundamentally
explainable on the ground that the substantial rights under
the confrontation clause of the United States Constitution,
and especially the right of cross-examination, may be
severely prejudiced when the information in the report calls
into question the motivation and the accuracy of the
perception, recall, the manner of the language usage, or the
soundness of the conclusions by the author of the report.
State v. Bertul. 664 P.2d 1181, 1186 (Utah 1983); see Peronek,
803 P.2d at 1299 (jail incident report admitted without testimony
of preparer violated due process confrontation rights).

Given

Utah's high regard for a defendant's confrontation rights, the
State's assertion that Oates' "restrictive view" is not
instructive is not well-founded.

Indeed, Oates mirrors Utah law

in preserving a defendant's confrontation rights by excluding law
enforcement reports, prepared in anticipation of litigation, or
when such reports concern nonroutine information susceptible to
biases of the reporter.

See Bertul, 664 P.2d at 1185.

Other jurisdictions criticize Oates and instead distinguish
between "law enforcement reports prepared in a routine, nonadversrial setting, and those resulting from the arguably more
subjective endeavor of investigating a crime and evaluating the
results of that investigation."

Quezada, 754 F.2d at 1194
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(warrant of deportation admissible as public record); see also
Christian, 895 P.2d at 682 (blood alcohol report admissible as
public record).

Further distinctions are drawn between reports

prepared by detached public servants and employees vested with
law enforcement power.

See Christian, 895 P.2d at 681 (employee

of N.M. health department); United States v. Rosa. 11 F.3d 315,
331-32 (2d Cir. 1993) (employee of Medical Examiner's office);
United States v. Blackburn, 992 F.2d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 1993)
(chemist employed by private firm to conduct lensometer test).
Even if this Court applies these distinctions, the report is
still excluded by 803(8) (B) .

First, as the State concedes, the

report was prepared by a chemist from the state crime lab, an
employee of a police department instrumentality whose express
function is to test substances for purposes of prosecuting crime.
See R.B. at 18; Utah Code Ann. § 53-5-104 (5)-(6) .

By contrast,

the report in Christian was prepared by a chemist employed by the
New Mexico department of health.

See Christian, 895 P.2d at 676.

Likewise, the report at issue in Yacht Club was prepared by a
chemist employed by the department of agriculture.

See Yacht

Club, 681 P.2d at 1227; see also Utah Code Ann. §§ 4-2-9, 4-2-10
(1953 as amended).

Such agencies are distinguishable because

they are "not an arm of law enforcement and [their] employees are
not law enforcement personnel."

Christian, 895 P.2d at 676.

Moreover, the report at issue here does not represent the
sort of mechanical, routine, and non-adversarial information
justified by Ouezada.

Unlike the deportation warrant at issue in
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Quezada, which contained unambiguous information including
defendant's thumbprint and location of deportation, the
information provided in the toxicology report was prepared in
anticipation of litigation by an arm of law enforcement for the
express purpose of prosecuting Rodriguez, thus raising concerns
of its reliability.

As noted in Peronek, such reports do "not

materially differ from a crime report or other investigatory
report expected to lead to some form of prosecutorial action."
See Peronek, 803 P.2d at 1298 (jail report inadmissible under
public record exception); see A.B. at 30-32 (full discussion of
admissibility of toxicology report under Utah case law and Rule
803(8) (B)) . Rather, the toxicology report here represents the
more "traditional law enforcement function[] of observation and
investigation of crime" where the chemist's perception may be
clouded.
In light of the foregoing, the report is excluded under Rule
803(8)(B).

The State does not address the admissibility of the

report under the business record exception, Utah R. Evid 803(6),
nor does the State assert that the report otherwise bears
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.

Consequently,

Rodriguez relies on his opening brief in stating that the report
is likewise inadmissible as a business record and for lack of
foundation which might otherwise establish the report's
reliability.

See A.B.at 23-30.

D. THE TRIAL COURT ADMITTED THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT IN
VIOLATION OF RODRIGUEZ'S RIGHTS OF CONFRONTATION.
The State incorrectly asserts that confrontation rights do
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not extend to preliminary hearings.

The State relies upon

Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1228 n.4 (citing Gerstein, 420 U.S. at
120-22) for the proposition that federal confrontation clause
rights do not extend to preliminary proceedings; and State v.
Brooks. 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981) for the assertion that
confrontation rights under "Article I, Section 12 should be
construed the same as the federal constitutional provision."
R.B. at 22.

See

The State further contends that Anderson does not

provide that full confrontation rights attach at a preliminary
hearing, and, even if they do, that Anderson is implicitly
overruled by Brooks.

Id.

First, Gerstein, as discussed supra note 1, is not
controlling over preliminary examinations which operate as
discovery and preservation devices, but rather applies only to
Fourth Amendment probable cause determinations in support of
pretrial custody.

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122-23.

Coleman,

rather, is controlling in this case where the preliminary
hearing, as in Utah, is a critical, adversarial stage of the
criminal proceeding.
P.2d at 646.

See Coleman, 3 99 U.S. at 9; Brickey, 714

Insofar as rights may be impacted at a preliminary

hearing, certain procedural protections are afforded a defendant
as a matter of due process.

Coleman 399 U.S. at 9 (right to

counsel at preliminary hearing); Brickey, 714 P.2d at 646
("proper consideration for defendant's constitutional rights");
Willet, 909 P.2d at 222 (cross-examination at preliminary hearing
provides impeachment evidence at trial).
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The Gerstein Court itself acknowledged this qualitative
difference between a bare pretrial custody probable cause
determination and the sort of adversarial preliminary hearing
involved in Coleman, and so limited its own holding to Fourth
Amendment probable cause determinations which are "addressed only
to pretrial custody" and serve a "limited function and [are]
nonadversary."

Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 122-23 ("we limit our

holding to the precise requirement of the Fourth Amendment").

To

the extent that Utah's preliminary hearing is a critical,
adversarial proceeding, Coleman, not Gerstein, is controlling.
Moreover, to the extent that Coleman is grounded in due
process confrontation rights, the Utah Supreme Court's holding in
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) instructs that the
level of federal confrontation rights afforded at a "critical"
preliminary examination should likewise be extended at a
"critical" preliminary examination under Article I, § 1 2 .

Id. at

542 (state confrontation rights are equivalent to federal
confrontation rights).
law.

By the same token, Anderson is still good

Anderson comports with Utah and federal case law which

acknowledges that a criminal defendant is entitled to a fair
preliminary hearing where, as in Utah, such hearing is a critical
stage.

As stated by the Anderson Court,

the right of confrontation at the preliminary examination
merely demands that the prosecution's use of hearsay
evidence at the hearing may not circumvent the defendant's
substantive rights to a fair hearing and a fair trial by
denying the defendant an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses who offer testimony at the hearing.
To this end, confrontation rights do attach, even if not the full
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scope of such rights as applied at trial.
In light of the foregoing, Rodriguez's confrontation rights
were violated by the admission of the toxicology report.
A.B. at 32-37.

See

The report, an unsworn document, was admitted

without the accompanying testimony of the preparer.

In addition,

the State did not offer any evidence establishing the reliability
of the testing procedures, nor the qualifications of the chemist.
In the absence of the preparer or other reliability evidence,
Rodriguez was stripped of even the minimum opportunity of
rebuttal.

Consequently, Rodriguez was denied his right of

confronting the evidence against him.

R. 70. Hence, the

toxicology report was not "reliable hearsay" where even the
slightest indicia of reliability were lacking.

R. 70-71.

E. WITHOUT THE TOXICOLOGY REPORT, THERE IS INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE BINDOVER DETERMINATION.
There was insufficient evidence to bind this case over on a
charge of possession, which requires a finding of a knowing and
intentional possession of a controlled substance.

See 58-37-

8(2) (a) (i) (1996) . As discussed above, the toxicology report was
inadmissible hearsay.

In addition, Rodriguez's statement was

admitted in violation of the corpus delicti rule.

See A.B. 38.

The corpus delicti rule, a rule of evidence, applies to
preliminary hearings pursuant to Rule 7(h)(1), Utah R. Crim. P.
("preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws
applicable to criminal cases tried before a court" and Rule
1101(b), Utah R. Evid. (providing exclusive list of situations
where evidence rules do not apply without mentioning preliminary
22

hearings except with regard to "reliable hearsay").

The corpus

delicti rule requires that before a defendant's statement may be
admitted the state must show by clear and convincing evidence
that (i) a wrong was done and (ii) such wrong was the result of
criminal conduct.

State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1162, 1164

(Utah 1992)2.
The balance of evidence presented by the State does not meet
this standard.

The officers' statements indicating that they saw

the baggie sticking out of Rodriguez's pocket and Schow's belief
that the substance therein was "consistent" with cocaine was
insufficient to establish that Rodriguez was in possession of a
controlled

substance.

Other evidence is necessary to establish

the substance as cocaine.
Schow's identification was, at best, speculative and
inconclusive.

He could not categorically identify the cocaine,

and even admitted that at times he confused cocaine with baking
soda.

See A.B. 39; R. 62-64.

So shaky was his identification

that the trial court struck his identifying testimony at trial.
R. 62-64.

Without other competent, corroborative evidence,

Schow's testimony was insufficient to establish the substance

2

This standard is consistent with the bindover standard,
which requires a "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant
submission of the case to the trier of fact." State v. Pledger,
896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah 1995). To the extent that the corpus
delicti rule merely requires the state to establish that a wrong
was done and the wrong was the result of criminal activity by
evidence independent of the defendant's statement, the bindover
standard likewise requires the state to establish evidence beyond
that which is "wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable
inference to prove some issue" in the state's case. Id.
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found on Rodriguez as cocaine.

C.f. Provo City Corp. v. Spotts.

861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993)(possession established where
officer recognized pot, saw defendant smoking it, cigarette was
short and disintegrated rapidly, method of inhalation was
consistent with pot smoking, officer smelled the pot).
The State asserts that Schow's identification, albeit
unsound, nonetheless supports a reasonable inference that the
substance was cocaine.

In Pledger, the Supreme Court found that

an officer's speculation that a sodomy victim was under 18 years
of age, the statutory age limit, was sufficient to bind the case
over to the trial court.

Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229-30.

Schow's

speculative guess at the identity of the substance is
distinguishable given the likelihood of mistaken identification.
Baking soda, a white powder substance, is easily confused with
cocaine, another white powder substance; without special training
and proper testing equipment, cocaine is difficult to identify by
sight.

In Pledger, on the other hand, it was unlikely that the

officer would mistake the juvenile male for a male over eighteen
years of age.

"Given the pattern of physical development among

young boys, it is unlikely that Officer Banks would have
mistakenly identified an eighteen-year-old boy as being
fourteen."

Given the high probability of mistaken

identification, Schow's testimony does not support the reasonable
inference necessary to support the bindover.
Moreover, Rodriguez's identifying statement did not support
Schow's testimony such that the bindover determination was
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proper.

Under Johnson, the "corpus delicti must be established

through evidence, independent of the confession or admission,
that 'the injury specified . . . occurred, and that such injury
was caused by someone's criminal conduct."
1162 (Quotation omitted).

Johnson, 821 P.2d at

Schow's testimony along with the

testimony asserting that the substance fell from Rodriguez's
person does not independently establish possession of a
controlled substance; the identity of the substance remained in
question.

As such, the only evidence identifying the substance

as cocaine was Rodriguez's statement, and identification may not
be premised on a defendant's statement standing alone.
In light of the foregoing, the bindover was not supported by
sufficient evidence, even under the relaxed bindover standard.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Rodriguez requests this court to
overturn his conviction based on the district court's erroneous
dismissal of his motion to quash bindover and motion to suppress
evidence seized pursuant to an illegal search.
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